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SPACE COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW: ADEQUATE
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AFTER 1963?

Samuel D. Estep* and Amalya L. Kearse**
the current year, a space event of legal and technological significance will occur. The American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (A.T. & T.), using the launching facilities
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
will launch its first satellite for research in the area of commercial
communications.t The A.T. & T. sphere will be the first tested
by a private, commercial organization specifically for business purposes-to implement a plan eventually to provide increased and
improved telecommunications on a grand scale at a lower cost.
The satellite will relay television signals from the United States
to England, Germany, and France. Before a communication network can be commercially feasible, however, certain legal problems of space communications must be solved.
Although the ownership and operation of the commercial
communication satellite system are primarily domestic questions,
the international ramifications have been a matter of some concern to our State Department. 1 To the extent that the satellite
will be used for communications with foreign countries, those
countries should perhaps have an opportunity to participate.
Indeed, President Kennedy has issued an invitation to all nations
to participate in a global communications system, through ownership or otherwise,2 although new legislation may be necessary to
achieve this. The Federal Communications Act prohibition on
granting a license to a corporation more than one-fifth of whose
stock is held by foreign interests3 would have to bow to this more
pressing international concern.
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• Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.-Ed.
• • Associate Editor, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
t After this article was accepted for publication but before this issue went to press,
Telstar was successfully launched on July IO, 1962. On this historic occasion three
countries sufficiently advanced technologically to be equipped to use the satellite
transmitted the following pictures across the Atlantic Ocean: United States-the
American flag; France-Yves Montand; Great Britain-the Post Office Department.S.D.E. & A.L.K.
1 Klass, Indecision Bogs Communication Satellites, Aviation Week, April 17, 1961,
p. 104.
2 Kennedy Sets Commercial Satellite Policy, Aviation Week, July 31, 1961, p. 25.
s 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 222(d) (1958).
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If a foreign state is not allowed to participate in the manner
or to the extent it wishes, or if it wishes not to participate and
not to have signals from the commercial satellites received in its
territory, or wants to prevent use of the system by anyone, it
could conceivably upset or interfere with the entire commercial
satellite program. In addition to potential piecemeal interference,
the possible development of a method of preventing a satellite
from even being successfully orbited is of real concern to the Defense Department and NASA.
At its 1959 Administrative Radio Conference, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) made allocations of several frequency bands for space and earth-space radiocommunication
services; however, all such allocations have been authorized for
one purpose only: research. This limitation of permissible uses
will have great significance in analyzing the problems attending
operational satellite systems which have been allocated no frequency channels. Already various satellites are being used by government agencies for weather observation ("Tiros"), 4 radionavigation ("Transit"),° and reconnaissance,6 as well as research.
4 Launched July 12, 1961. See Aviation Week, July 17, 1961, p. 37. Another weather
observation satellite, "Nimbus," is planned by NASA to carry six television cameras,
solar converters, recorders, and command equipment. See Alexander, Nimbus Uses
Wheels, Jets for Control, Aviation Week, July 10, 1961, pp. 77-79.
5 Launched June 28, 1960. See Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in Space, 60 MICH. L. REv.
269, 298, n.101 (1962). This Navy satellite system would enable ships to fix their positions
to within one-half mile, by receiving signals from four satellites. The satellites would
transmit at a very high frequency in a narrow band at stated times and would operate
in any weather.
6 Already in use are the "Midas" and "Samos" satellites. The Samos satellite is
designed for reconnaissance with high-resolution cameras. See Aviation Week, Feb. 6,
1961, p. 30. Midas is an infra-red, early warning satellite for the detection of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Midas missile orbits are planned so that the Air
Force will be able to observe the whole earth with about ten satellites in polar orbit.
Cf. Aviation Week, Jan. 16, 1961, p. 88. Still in the development stage are three more
reconnaissance satellites: "Lofter,'' "Vela Hotel," and "Early Spring." Lofter is a system
using infra-red and ultra-violet rays for detection of hostile ICBM's during their boost
phase. See Comment, USAF To Fund New ICBM Warning System, Aviation Week,
April 3, 1961, p. 33. The Vela Hotel satellite will detect nuclear explosions in outer
space, 50,000 to 75,000 nautical miles from earth. The first of five launches of two
satellites each is scheduled for 1963-1964. These spheres will monitor space in all directions. To escape detection, a test ban violator would have to test an unshielded device
more than 100 million miles from earth. Johnsen, Space Nuclear Test Research Accelerated, Aviation Week, Aug. 7, 1961, p. 33. Early Spring is the Navy's space mine system;
it is a vertical interceptor satellite containing an optical scanning system capable of
discriminating between stars, known harmless or friendly vehicles, and suspect orbiting
objects. It will be able to identify targets and relay data to the ground for positive con-
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Because the limited number of frequencies technologically available for space use7 have been authorized for other uses or for
research, communications with operational satellite systems are
now unauthorized and could, in fact, cause harmful interference
with validly licensed occupants of the radio spectrum. Moreover,
operational systems cannot at this time claim ITU protection
against harmful interference whether caused intentionally or unintentionally.
Important as these problems are, however, the most immediate
threat to the proposed plan is the possibility of intentional interference with its communication signals. Analysis of the proprieties of jamming must include some consideration of customary
international law and an examination of the scope and effect of
existing international agreements for dealing with interference.
Because existing international law, both customary and treaty, is
inadequate to meet the needs of a successful satellite communication system, some suggestions will be made as to questions which
must be answered at an early date.
The first opportunity for reaching answers to some of these
questions will come next year. At the 1959 ITU Radio Conference, the delegates tentatively scheduled for 1963 an Extraordinary Conference, primarily for the purpose of allocating the frequencies necessary for controlling and using satellites. It is clear,
however, that mere allocation of frequencies will not assure the
success of the programs contemplated. Although a scheme of
allocations will minimize unintentional interference, procedures
to cope with intentional interference require additional consideration; the mere allocation of frequency bands to one service or
another will not insure inviolability. And just as allocation of
trol of destruction if desired. Its optical scanning system is said to be so sensitive that
it will be able to pick up a pinpoint target in a test room so small that it would be
scarcely visible to an observer who would have had the precise location shown to him.
This satellite may include instruments for the destruction of a target; destruction would
be achieved by the satellite's aligning itself in a near-collision head-on orbit, with
destruction achieved by using a proximity-sensitive device to make direct collision unnecessary. See Aviation Week, March 13, 1961, p. 75; Aviation Week, July 17, 1961,
p. 38.
7 The "frequency" of a transmission is determined by the length of the radio wave.
Because of differences in propagation characteristics of waves of various lengths, only
certain frequencies can pass through the ionosphere, the strongly ionized layer just
above the height of 80 kilometers above sea level. This "frequency-selective" characteristic of the ionosphere limits the number of usable frequencies and makes frequency
allocation an important policy decision.
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frequencies cannot be divorced from regulation of jamming, so
both of these problems are inextricably bound up with other problems such as ownership, access, and regulation of the satellite systems-problems which, if unsolved, may provide powerful incentives to jam. There can be no guarantee of a successful satellite
program until there is thoughtful and productive consideration
of these interrelated problems.

I.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Jamming as Protest Against Transgression by Radiowaves
It is an accepted principle of customary international law that
a state has the right to object to transgression of its territory by
offensive radiowaves of foreign origin. 8 It can object either by
diplomatic protest or by interfering with the radio signal, otherwise known as jamming. The latter is the state's only unilaterally
effective means of enforcing its sovereign right to exclude a signal
from its territory. The right to jam bears with it the duty, so far
as possible, not to transmit with so much power that reception of
the signal is prevented in other states; 9 however, it has been suggested that if reception in other innocent states is interrupted
unavoidably, the right to jam has not been abused. 10 Moreover,
a state is entitled to jam an offending signal even though its jamming signal must obliterate radio communication on that frequency within the territory from which the transmission emanates.11
Jamming is usually accomplished by broadcasting a buzz or
other raucous sound on the same frequency used by the offending
broadcaster, with enough power that the offending signal is
drowned out. This is the way the Soviet Union jams Voice of
America, but Voice of America has equipment with which it can
change frequencies, playing, as it were, a game of hide-and-seek
with the Soviet buzz. Because broadcasting equipment is extremely
A.

s See BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 325 (2d ed. 1952); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 192 (2d ed. 1945); JESSUP
&: TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 204: (1959);
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); STENUIT, LA RADIO•
PHONIE ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 137 (1932).
9 See BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 310-13; Scott, The Institute of International
Law, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 716, 728 (1927). See also Appendix, example 2.
10 STENUIT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 139.
11 See HYDE, op. cit. supra note 8; Scott, supra note 9.
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expensive, and is usually associated with a specific frequency, most
services are unable to avail themselves of more than one channel.12
There have, of course, been other instances of international jamming. When a Moscow station broadcast criticisms of the Roumanian government into Roumania and urged the people to revolt, the Roumanian government buzz-jammed the Moscow station, as it apparently had a right to do. 13 On another occasion,
during a general strike in England, when radio was the only means
of communication between the government and the people, the
most important British station was buzz-jammed by Moscow. 14 If
this was done intentionally, it was clearly in contravention of international law principles.
Two theories have been offered by which a state has the right
to jam: by one, the right results from the state's exclusive national
sovereignty over its airspace; 16 by the other, the right is included
in the sovereign right of a state to punish crimes against its security, although they are committed in another country, if the punitive action does not violate a third state's sovereignty. 16 By the
first theory, the right to exclude foreign radio signals is dependent
upon the state's relation to the "airspace" above it. 17 Radiowaves,
however, are not airborne objects; they are electromagnetic impulses which travel independently of the atmosphere. They do
not actually "disturb" 18 the airspace; and especially in the context
of satellite communications, the fact that they pass through airspace at all is incidental. Therefore, to base the right to jam
solely on the ownership of airspace is to assume a context artificial
for the purposes of regulating radio transmission. 19 Since radiowaves do not in fact observe airspace as a controlling boundary>
airspace alone should not govern the right to use or jam them.
The national security theory, on the other hand, appears to
12 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON .AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 86TH CONG., 2d!.
SESs., REPORT ON POLICY PLANNING FOR SPACE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 34 (Comm. Print
1960) [hereinafter cited as SENATE STAFF REPORT].
13 See W. DAVIS, RADIO LAw 359 (1929). There is no indication as to whether or not
the buzz signal jammed stations outside of Roumania.
14 Ibid.
16 See BRIGGS, HYDE, JESSUP &: TAUBENFELD, and OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 8.
16 Sec STENurr, op. cit. supra note 8.
17 See Appendix, example 3.
18 Statement by Cooper in a discussion in 1956 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
SocIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
19 Ibid.
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condone jamming whether or not the signals pass through the
state's airspace. If the signal constitutes a threat to the state's
security, the state can legitimately jam the signal although it does
not pass through its airspace. However, a signal which bypasses a
state's airspace is not receivable in that state, and the jamming,
to have any effect at all, would necessarily be a jamming of the
reception in another state, either directly or by disabling the relay
equipment carried by a transmitting satellite.20 Jamming another
state directly would usually be precluded by the theory itselfthe concomitant duty not to infringe on the sovereignty of another
state.21 Only if the offending broadcast were an act of the other
government or condoned by the government would it seem that
a direct jamming of the transmission would not constitute a breach
of the duty. On the other hand, there appears to be nothing prohibiting a state's jamming the satellite itself, by overloading its
components so that no use may be made of that frequency. 22 Outside of a call-to-arms against a state by its neighbors-an unlikely
subject for a broadcast, but perhaps not so improbable as one
might initially suspect23-it is difficult to imagine a situation in
which a signal incapable of reception in that state would constitute a real peril to its security. Nevertheless, an instance which
suggests itself as a possible source of an assertion of the right to
jam is the broadcast of a propaganda program into a "satellite"
country. It is conceivable that the parent country would claim
the right to jam that broadcast especially if the parent country
did not have a "puppet" government in the satellite country to
do its bidding. In such a case, only the state invaded by the
signals should have the right to counteract the intrusion, not the
parent state at whom the propaganda may be indirectly aimed.24
20 See statement and testimony of Pierce in Hearings Before the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 9, at 35 (Comm. Print 1959). A
passive satellite carries no equipment; it merely reflects signals back to receivers on
earth. The passive-type satellite, therefore, could not be jammed directly.
21 See BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 298, 310-11.
22 A satellite will be equipped to transmit only a few frequencies. The problem then
is the same as for ground stations, the inability to change frequencies when one is
jammed.
23 Art. 2, International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause
of Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, prohibits just such a situation. For a more
extended discussion of this convention, see infra.
• 24 Practically, such a signal would not be receivable by the great majority of people
in the "satellite" state, since reception may well require special equipment. It has been
suggested, however, that someone interested enough in propaganda might manufacture
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Technologically, there seems to be no means of erasing a
signal buzz-jamming a passive satellite (one which only reflects
signals), except perhaps by transmitting with all the more power~
which usually is not feasible. An active satellite (one which receives and rebroadcasts signals) is subject to the additional peril
of being jammed by having its receiving and retransmission components overloaded, disabling it for the purposes of its legitimate
users. 25 Practically, there is no difference between loss of communications caused by jamming a ground transmitter and by jamming a satellite; nor should there be a legal difference. Therefore, the possibility of jamming a communication satellite brings
into focus the need to define, if possible, the status of outer space.

B. Airspace and National Sovereignty
The general consensus of the majority of jurists is that existing
international agreements recognize the sovereignty of a state over
its superjacent "airspace," and that space beyond the earth's atmosphere is not included.26 Under this "orbit point" theory, the
upper boundary of "airspace" is the height at which a vehicle
ceases to be lifted by air currents and starts circling the earth by
centrifugal force. 27 Therefore, since satellites do not travel by
and sell at very low prices receiving sets to people in areas which would otherwise not
be able to receive broadcasts. See Smythe, Communications Satellites, 17 Buu. ATOMIC
SCIENTISfS 65, 68 (1961).
25 This additional peril, however, may be more amenable to technological solution.
See Pierce statement and testimony, supra note 20; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1961, p. 53, col. I.
26 Galina, On the Question of Interplanetary Law, in SYMPOSIUM PREPARED FOR
SENATE CO?,IM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, LEG.AL PROBLEMS OF SPACE EXPLORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1051 (1961) [hereinafter referred to as
SENATE SYMPOSIUM]. See also statements of Roy, Meyer, Schachter, and Cooper at the
1956 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law as reported by Haley,
Space Law and Metalaw-Jurisdiction Defined, 24 J. Am L. &: CoM. 286 (1957); Jenks,
International Law and Activities in Space, 5 INT'L &: COMP. L.Q. 99 (1956).
27 Cooper, The Problem of a Definition of "Airspace," in SYMPOSIUM PREPARED FOR
SENATE SPEC. COMM. ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SPACE LAw, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 403
(Comm. Print 1959). This appears to be the best definition of the upper boundary of
airspace formulated thus far. Its main attraction is that it provides a line that is
capable of physical and mathematical demarcation at a reasonbly stable height. (For an
object traveling at 25,000 feet per second the line would be approximately 275,000
feet above the earth's surface.) This definition also abandons the contention that aerodynamic lift must be the sole support available to the vehicle up to the line of demarcation between airspace and outer space. Its principal defect lies in the fact that the line
will vary with change in design and other factors of the particular flight instrumentality
concerned. Ibid. It is suggested, however, that the definition provides the main thrust
of a sound and workable rule, without actually describing the thing whose definition
was attempted, unless "airspace" is deemed to be a word of art. Generally, "airspace"
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airlift,28 they revolve in an area unregulated by international treaty
law.29 A few jurists have tendered the theory that a state's territory
extends upward to the height to which it can exercise effective
control-regardless of what conventions have recognized; 30 and a
few others have interpreted the existing conventions and agreements with respect to "airspace" as properly having application to
outer space, on the theory that the framers of those conventions
did not intend to use "airspace" in its limited scientific sense, and
did not foresee the need to be scientifically and technically precise
in describing the space above a state.31 The latter theorists, then,
would say that existing agreements recognize the sovereignty of
each state upward ad infinitum.32 Under neither theory, of course,
would space over the high seas be subject to a claim of jurisdiction.
If the airspace limitation were accepted, outer space would
be freed of all regulation, unless formal agreements were made;
until then any nation could orbit a satellite. By the same token,
however, such a satellite would be vulnerable to being jammed
without legal protection. If, on the other hand, the sovereignty
is thought to designate the earth's atmosphere; since the earth's atmosphere extends to
1,000 miles or more above the earth, much satellite flight will be within the upper regions
of the atmosphere. "In discussing air and space, it should be recognized that there is
no division, per se, between the two. For all practical purposes air and space merge,
forming a continuous and indivisible field of operation." White, Air and Space Are
Indivisible, Air Force Magazine, March 1958, pp. 40, 41.
28 But see theories offered by French jurists, cited note 31 infra.
Since Russia has "depreciated the authority of customary international law and
suggested that durable international rules arise only from the explicit consent of the
states," it has been suggested that informal law may have little weight. Note, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 1154, 1155 (1961). See Margolis, Soviet Views on the Relationship Between
National and International Law, 4 INT'L & Cm,n>. L.Q. 116, 123, 126 (1955); Triska &
Slusser, Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations: The Soviet
View, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 699, 713, 715, 720-21 (1958). It is noteworthy, however, that the
Soviet Union has seen fit, in connection with at least one treaty, to reserve to itself
its customary rights "under the general rules of international law .•.." See proces-verbal
of the International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 317. Furthermore, it has been argued that in
view of the ITU's having regulated airborne or floating objects outside national territories
in article 7 of the ITU Radio Regulations, the Union has demonstrated its competence
to deal with space problems which are outside the jurisdiction of any nation, without
modification of the present ITU convention. See Glazer, supra note 5, at 301-02.
30 KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 218 (1945); Cooper, High Altitude
Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 INT'L L.Q. 411 (1951). This attitude has since been
abandoned by Cooper. See Legal Problems of upper Space, 1956 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROCEEDINGS.
31 See Danier & Saporta, Les Satellites Artifidels, 18 REv. GEN. DE L'Am. 297 (1955);
Hingorani, La Souverainete sur l'Espace Exoatmospherique, 20 REv. GEN. DE L'Am. 248
(1957).
32 Hingorani, supra note 31.
29
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of a state be deemed to extend upward usque ad coelum, each
passage of a satellite over a territory would be a trespass, which
each subjacent state would have the right to prevent or penalize.33
Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has, in fact, acknowledged any upper limit on her own national sovereignty; nor
has either publicly entertained any notion that her satellites are
trespassing on the territories of the world. One Russian legal
scholar has stated that satellites violate no treaties or agreements.
His contention is that they do not violate the air sovereignty of
any state because they do not "pass over" any state. Rather, the
territories of the states, because of the earth's rotation, pass under
the satellite's orbit which is fixed in relation to the earth and the
stars.34
But assuming some concept of violation of airspace is retained,
there are two additional theories pertinent to each of the foregoing theories regardless of which upper limit is used. These
theories concern the lateral measurement of the upward extent
of national sovereignty. By the commonly accepted theory, lines
would be drawn from the center of the earth through the boundary points of each state, straight out to or into space. The superjacent air or space territories of adjacent states would thus be
contiguous. One author, however, has suggested that the superjacent territory of each state might be a column of air, or air and
space, formed by parallel lines which would in effect be parallel
to the line between the center of the earth and the geometric
center of the territory. 35 The implementation of this theory would
leave wedges of air and space which, like the air over the high
seas, would belong to no state. These wedges could mean the difference between legitimate and illegitimate jamming of a radio
signal36 or of a satellite.37 This theory would move toward constricting the states' right to jam, but there are two serious objections. First, the near-impossibility of constructing in practice the
cylindrical lines required offsets any positive value to be gained
from the restriction of the right to jam. Second, it would increase
33 See Appendix, example 2; BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 310.
34 Zadorozhnyi, The Artificial Satellite and International Law, SENATE SYMPOSIUM
1054.
35 Schofield, Control of Outer Space, 10 Am. U.Q. REv. 93 (1958). See Appendix,
example 1.
36 See Appendix, example 4.
37 See Appendix, example 5.
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the number of unregulated areas from which radio signals could
be sent to a given state without any nation necessarily being responsible.38 Although the space above the high seas is also susceptible to this use, there is no sense in multiplying the dangers,
and there seems to be little justification for adopting a theory that
will provide this additional unregulated space.
Leaving aside the lateral boundary theories, neither of the
alternative doctrines proposed to define the upper limit of national sovereignty offers a satellite immunity from legitimate jamming; the one theory, the usque ad coelum theory, condones jamming, while the other, the airspace theory, neither condones nor
condemns. On the usque ad coelum theory, a state could legitimately obstruct space activities over its territory by objects such
as military satellites which violated its "public policy." This theory holds attraction for small states interested not merely in their
own internal security, but in the furtherance of the public policy
of the United Nations39 and the survival of mankind. This theory
is the only remaining basis on which such a state can justify interfering when its own internal security is not involved. It would,
however, lead to the farfetched result of segmenting all of outer
space and requiring permission from all nations for satellite flight.
On the other hand, the airspace theory, places satellites outside
the protection of any nation. This means that state A would have
no right to jam state B's satellite, but state B also would have no
right to protest if state A did jam. Airspace principles thus are of
little real assistance in matters of satellite communications.
To fill some of the gaps left by the airspace theories, some
writers have proposed that the law of space be formed by analogy
to the law of the high seas.40 Space, like the high seas, would be
unregulated; the celestial bodies would be like the newly discovered continents and, therefore, subject to national sovereignty
claims, or like the sedentary fisheries of the high seas, belonging
38 Furthermore, from a position sufficiently high above the earth's surface, a bomb
could be dropped from outside a state which, by virtue of the earth's rotation, could
fall 250 miles within that state. See Schofield, supra note 35.
39 Glazer, supra note 5, at 292-93, discusses the abuse of right principle.
40 See Schachter, Who Owns the Universe?, ACROSS THE SPACE FRONTIER 118-31 (Ryan
ed. 1952). It is interesting to note that Grotius, in arguing for freedom of the seas,
analogized the sea to the air (in those days not differentiated from space), which he
said was by nature incapable of appropriation. See GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE

SEAS 28 (1608).
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to the states which effectively used and exploited them without
impeding free space travel.41 However, the problems involved in
conquering the cosmos are by their nature different from those
which concern maritime and air navigation,42 and would seem to
require different solutions. Furthermore, whereas the military
danger from the sea decreases for a nation as the distance between
it and a warship increases, recent thought is that, because of the
added range in vision, the danger to a nation may actually increase
as the distance between it and a spaceship increases, at least up to
1,000 miles. 43 It is apparent that the road to a logical and reasonable law of space and space communications does not lie in asking
what is the law of the sea.44
The belief that outer space must have a legal "status" which
can be discovered or agreed upon is apparently a volatile assumption.45 Instead, the question to be asked is: "What legal consequences should be entailed by certain activities in order that they
be accommodated with other activities under given policies?"46
The test should not be whether it passes through a state's airspace
or whether it threatens a state's security. Rather, an initial test
should be whether or not the radio signal is generally receivable
in the jamming state47 and transmits a message whose character
justifies interference with reception. This question cuts across
the two proffered standards to reach the essential problem of impact on the receiving state. Any formulated answers should include the rule that a state be forbidden to jam signals by disabling
the broadcasting equipment of a satellite, and be limited to overSee Schachter, supra note 40.
See Korovin, International Status of Cosmic Space, Int'l Affairs (U.S.S.R.) Jan.
1959, pp. 53, 54-55.
43 See Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, SENATE SYMPOSIUM 169; von
Braun, Prelude to Space Travel, ACROSS THE SPACE FRONTIER 12-70 (Ryan ed. 1952).
44 Cf. MATEESCO, DRorr AfRIEN-AERoNAUTIQUE 75-77 (1954). Mateesco reasons that
space law logically cannot come from analogy to sea law. The sea is finite in all dimensions and is a material substance. Space, on the other hand, is non-material. It is that
within which all else exists, but it does not itself have an objective nature and should
not be reified. Even the term "airspace" ("l'espace aerien") is a misjoinder of terms, and
should be rather "air place" ( "le milieu aerien").
45 See McDougal & Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L.
407 (1958).
46 Id. at 412 n.15. See also MATEESCO, op. cit. supra note 44.
47 Under this formulation, states which are technologically advanced could put
radio installations high in their airspace at a position to intercept, claim interference
from, and jam satellite signals whose direction was such that they were not generally
receivable on the ground. For practical purposes, this category of states now includes
only the Soviet Union and the United States.
41
42
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powering within its own territory any offending signal. It could
perhaps jam reception of the signal in another state if that state
so allowed or requested, provided the jamming did not require
intrusion on the reception of the signal in a third state which did
not want the signal jammed.
It is very doubtful, however, that satisfactory answers can be
formulated on a case-by-case basis under customary international
law principles. Instead, specific treaty coverage will be required
to meet the challenge presented by these rapid advances in technology.
II. TREATY LAW

A. The Broadcasting Treaty of 1936
Initial consideration, in the area of formal agreements, should
be given to the International Convention Concerning the Use of
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, signed at Geneva in 1936.48
This treaty, seeking to make new international law, rather than
merely codifying customary law, is currently binding upon relatively few countries.49 The main thrust of its provisions is the
condemnation of international transmissions constituting an incitement to war or revolt, 50 and transmissions of incorrect information likely to ripple international tranquility. 51 The Convention requires that harmful "statements the incorrectness of
which is or ought to be known to the persons responsible for
the broadcast," must be corrected at the earliest possible time
and by the most effective means, "even if the incorrectness has
become apparent only after the broadcast has taken place."u2
The 1926 Moscow broadcasts into Roumania, mentioned earlier,53 urging the Roumanian people to revolt, would have been
outlawed by the Convention provision forbidding incitement of
Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301.
Only India, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Denmark, New Zealand, Luxem•
burg, Brazil, France, Norway, Egypt, and Estonia signed and ratified the Convention.
Australia, Burma, Southern Rhodesia, Union of South Africa, Ireland, Sweden, Salvador,
Guatemala, and Finland acceded to the Convention; Albania, Argentina, Austria,
Belgium, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Lithuania, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Roumania, Spain, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, the Soviet Union,
and Uruguay signed, but did not ratify, the Convention. The United States and Germany
neither signed and ratified, nor acceded to the Convention. 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 303.
50 See arts. 1, 2, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 309.
51 See arts. 3, 4, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 309.
52 Art. 3, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 309.
53 See notes 13 and 14 supra, and accompanying text.
48

49
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a population to "acts incompatible with the internal order or the
security" of a contracting party. 54 And although an exhaustive
set of measures is provided for the settlement of disputes such as
this, actually there is nothing in the body of the Convention which
detracts from the Roumanian claim of the right to jam the Moscow transmission. The only factor militating against the recognition of such a right is the specific reservation by three states55
of the right to jam an improper transmission. From the fact that
some states felt it necessary to make explicit reservation of the
right to jam, it may be argued that the treaty has closed to its
~igner~ the remedial avenues customarily available, including
Jammmg.
No compelling reason exists for limiting the scope and effect
of this Convention to earth transmissions. It is true that international agreements, exclusive of the 1959 ITU Radio Regulations, are generally deemed to be moored to their "airspace" context. 66 But the effect of a treacherous transmission will be the
same whether it travels directly from state to state or first uses a
satellite as a staging platform. Certainly had the drafters and
signers been able to project their thinking into today's orbit,
there would have been no difference in the provisions, no words
to exclude satellite transmissions from the proscriptions of the
Convention.
The effectiveness of the Convention today, however, in connection with outer space activities, would be limited at best. The
Soviet Union, although it signed the Convention, never ratified it,
and the United States did not sign, ratify, or accede to the Convention and did not become a member of the League of Nations.
Thus, with these two strikes against it, the Broadcasting Convention will of necessity bow to the International Telecommunication Convention as a possible coordinator of interests to be furthered by communication systems.
B.

The International Telecommunication Union

The International Telecommunication Union, which today is
a specialized agency of the United Nations, had its origin in the
1, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 309.
Belgium, Spain, the Soviet Union. See the proces-verbal, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, at 314,
315, 317.
ISO See text accompanying note 26 supra.
IS4a Art.
ISIS
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International Telegraph Union, formed in 1865.57 Today it includes among its 54 members who accepted the 1959 Convention
most of the leading nations of the world.58 Its rule-making process,
however, is quite a cumbersome one. Its treaties and regulations
are binding only on states that have accepted them; regulations
annexed to the Convention may be changed only after an Administrative Conference, which convenes every few years, and even
then each signatory is free to append to Regulations thus promulgated any conditions or reservations it wishes. In addition, in
some countries such as the United States final acceptance is further delayed by the necessity of obtaining formal approval as for
a treaty. Nevertheless, in 1959, the deliberations of the Administrative Radio Conference resulted significantly in the insertion in
a revision of the Radio Regulations, of frequency allocations for
newly-defined space radiocommunication services. This marked
the first international accord directed specifically toward outer
space activities.
I. Limitations as to Frequencies Covered: As a result of the
1959 Conference, the ITU has specified the types of services to
operate on all frequency bands between ten kilocycles and forty
gigacycles. 59 These two frequencies, however, do not mark the
limits of frequencies technologically available for space transmissions. There have been recent successes with submarine-to-satellite-to-submarine relays in the 3-30 kc range, 60 and the Echo I
satellite, launched in August of 1960, made transmissions on a
frequency of 2,000 gc.61 Operations on these frequencies which
do not interfere with transmissions between 10 kc and 40 gc are
57 For history of the ITU, see CODDING, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
UNION-AN EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1952); Glazer, The Law-Making
Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in Space,
60 MICH. L. REv. 269, 269-84 (1962).
58 The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom accepted the 1959
Convention. Italy, Germany, and France have not yet done so. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREA•
TIES IN FoRCE 287 (1962). U.S. Dept. of State Communique, May 17, 1962. Many more nations, including all the major powers, are members of the ITU under earlier conventions
which are still binding. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FoRCE 287 (1962).
59 A gigacycle (gc) is one billion cycles. Usually called kilomegacycles, the new term
has been brought into use by the ITU.
60 See Aviation Week, April 10, 1961, p. 39.
61 F. Llewellyn, "Sky Hooks for Telephone Systems," Lectures sponsored by Institute
of Science and Technology and given at The University of Michigan, Jan. 11 &: 12,
1961 (unpublished). Other ultra high frequencies have been proposed for earth-space
use; specifically, the American Rocket Society has suggested that the band from 80 to
81 gc be set aside for space use. See SENATE STAFF REPORT 85.
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apparently outside the scope of the ITU provisions, and so are
neither regulated nor protected by the Convention. Practically,
however, most of the frequencies available for space use are within
the portion of the spectrum covered by the ITU.62
2. Limitations as to Uses: The frequency assignments made
in Geneva in 1959 for space and earth-space services, were limited
to use for research purposes only. There is no indication in the
Radio Regulations as to just what constitutes research, and conceivably the line between experimentation and commercial or
other services using communication satellites could become very
difficult to draw. Use of the ITU space frequencies for nonresearch purposes such as navigation, weather reporting, and commercial communications would be unauthorized,63 and such operations would be accorded no ITU protection. Since article 3
of the Regulations requires that non-military frequency assignments be made only on the express condition that harmful interference not be caused to services carried on in accordance with the
Convention and its Regulations, any of these services might momentarily be required to cease its transmissions. 64 Yet it is absolutely essential for technical reasons that channels of communication to satellites and, indeed, to all missiles be kept clear. 65
3. Limitations as to Enforcement Procedures: The procedures designed to cope with problems of harmful interference are
outlined in article 15 of the Radio Regulations. The state having
jurisdiction over the station experiencing the interference must
notify the state having jurisdiction over the interfering station, and
the latter state is then obligated to take such steps as may be
necessary to eliminate the interference.66 It is doubtful that this
procedure will be successful when the interference has been an
intentional act by the government or its agency. If the protest fails,
the state concerned can forward details of the case to the InternaSee note 7 supra.
It has been suggested that these systems would not be forbidden per se, but
merely would not be given protection and would be required to protect from harmful
interference the services operating according to the ITU Radio Regulations. See Glazer,
supra note 57, at 290 n.72.
64 ITU Radio Regulations, para. 611 (Geneva 1959).
65 Interference may delay launching or may jeopardize the launching itself at the
instant of "lift-off." It may cause loss of telemetered data from experiments in progress,
or it may cause failure of command and guidance systems from the ground. See SENATE
62
OS

STAFF REPORT 67.
66 ITU Radio

Regulations, paras. 704-13 (Geneva 1959).
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tional Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), a permanent organ
of the ITU, "for its information," 67 and request the Board to act
in accordance with article 9, section VII of the Regulations. That
section provides, in part, that in cases of alleged contravention or
non-observance of the Regulations, or of harmful interference, the
Board should prepare and forward to the states concerned a report
containing its findings and recommendations for the solution of
the problem. Article 9 further provides that if no answer is received from one or more of the states concerned within thirty
days, the Board "shall consider that the suggestions or recommendations concerned are unacceptable to the administrations which
did not answer. If it was the requesting administration which
failed to answer within this period, the Board shall close the
study." 68 Presumably, a negative inference may be drawn from the
last sentence of this section, to the effect that the Board's study
would not be terminated by a failure to answer by the state whose
action is complained of. Since no further steps are prescribed for
the Board to take, it is perhaps to be inferred that the Board will
begin its study cycle again, or send out more suggestions.
Compare with the procedures outlined in the Regulations, the
remedial provisions in the Broadcasting Convention. The latter
treaty outlines a series of steps designed to reach an ultimate solution to the matter in dispute: the controversy would be negotiated
first in diplomatic channels, then, if necessary, in conformity with
provisions in force between the parties for the settlement of international disputes; if these measures failed, the matter would then
be submitted first to arbitration, then, if necessary, to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal constituted in conformity with The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. 69
ITU Radio Regulations, para. 716 (Geneva 1959).
ITU Radio Regulations, para. 634 (Geneva 1959).
Art. 7, International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause
of Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 311: "Should a dispute arise between the High
Contracting Parties regarding the interpretation or application of the present Convention
for which it has been found impossible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement through the
diplomatic channel, it shall be settled in conformity with the provisions in force between
the Parties concerning the settlement of international disputes.
"In the absence of any such provisions between the Parties to the dispute, the said Parties shall submit it to arbitration or to judicial settlement. Failing agreement concerning the
choice of another tribunal, they shall submit the dispute, at the request of one of them,
to the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided they are all Parties to the
Protocol of December 16th, 1920, regarding the Statute of the Court; or, if they are not
67
68
69
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The only provision in the International Telecommunication
Convention for settlement of disputes appears in article 27 which
recommends diplomatic negotiations, and provides, in the alternative, an arbitration arrangement. The decision of the arbitrators
of the dispute is to be final and binding on the parties.70 There is,
however, no intimation as to how a state which refuses to accede
to an arbitration award against it would be compelled to comply.
There is also no clear indication in the Convention or in the
Regulations as to whether or not the provisions for settlement of
disputes were intended to replace the customary right of a state
to jam an offending signal. At the Madrid ITU Conference of
1932, an Italian proposal to codify the sovereign right of a state
to jam any emission which appeared dangerous to its security, or
was contrary to the laws of the country, or to public order or
decency, found no support from the conference, and lapsed.71 The
refusal of the conventions to codify the right to jam radio signals,
together with the explicit reservation to members who signed and
ratified the 1959 Convention of the "right to cut off any private
telephone or telegraph communication which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to their laws, to public
order or to decency," 72 adds weight to the proposition that the
ITU provisions were meant to supplant jamming rather than to
supplement it. Article 32 of the Convention, however, reserves to
each member the "right to suspend the international telecommunication service for an indefinite time, either generally or only
for certain relations and/ or for certain kinds of correspondence,
outgoing, incoming, or in transit, provided that it immediately
notifies such action to each of the other Members and Associate
Members through the medium of the General Secretariat."73
A strong argument can be made for reading this article as alall Parties to the above Protocol, they shall submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal,
constituted in conformity with the Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
"Before having recourse to the procedures specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above,
the High Contracting Parties may, by common consent, appeal to the good offices of the
International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, which would be in a position to
constitute a special committee for this purpose."
70

Annex 4, "Arbitration," International Telecommunication Convention, para. 409,

75 (Geneva 1959).
71
72
78

See MANCE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 36-40 (1944).
Art. 31, para. 2, International Telecommunication Convention 31 (Geneva 1959).
Art. 32, International Telecommunication Convention 31-32 (Geneva 1959).
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lowing a state merely to cease its participation in an international service, without allowing it to jam a signal in whose reception it plays no official part. On the other hand, reading the word
"suspend" as "exclude" gives a nation the right to prevent any
incoming transmission, and jamming is not explicitly forbidden
as the means.
Some inference may perhaps be drawn from the failure of the
members expressly to reserve the customary international right to
jam. Such reservations were made by the Belgian and Spanish
delegations to the Broadcasting Treaty; 74 and the Soviet delegation
to that Convention expressly reserved the customary rights pending settlement of a dispute according to the treaty's provisions.7 G
The ITU Convention Protocol contains "general" reservations
only by Ghana, Guinea, and Iran,76 and special reservations in this
respect only by Israel and the Arab republics against each other. 77
Moreover, the "general" reservations are made contingent upon
the failure of an offending Member to comply with the requirements of the Convention or upon the imperiling of telecommunication services by the reservations to the Convention by a Member.
Despite the possible contrary inference to be drawn from the absence of reservation of the right to jam, the more realistic conclusion from the ambivalence of the ITU Convention and Regulations is that ITU provisions do not forbid resort to the customary
international right to jam an offending signal.
4. Limitations as to Military Installations: Article 47 of the
ITU Convention contains the provisions dealing with harmful
interference from all except military radio installations:
"I. All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to result in
harmful interference to the radio services or communications
of other Members or Associate Members or of recognized private operating agencies which carry on radio service, and
which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio
Regulations.
"2. Each Member or Associate Member undertakes to
See 186 L.N.T.S. at 314, 315.
See 186 L.N.T.S. at 317.
See Final Protocol, International Telecommunication Convention, number XX.VII
(Geneva 1959).
77 See Final Protocol, International Telecommunication Convention, numbers XII
and XXIV (Geneva 1959).
74
75
76
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require the private operating agencies which it recognizes
and the other operating agencies duly authorized for this
purpose, to observe the provisions of ... [paragraph I].
"3. Further, the Members and Associate Members recognize the desirability of taking all practicable steps to prevent the operation of electrical apparatus and installations
of all kinds from causing harmful interference to the radio
services or communications mentioned in ... [paragraph I]."
This provision must be read, however, in the light of article 50
of the Convention which reserves to members their complete freedom with regard to military radio installations of their army,
naval, and air forces, merely urging them to observe, so far as
possible, the provisions of the Convention and the Regulations.
This provision apparently cuts through the ITU regulations and
allocations so that a state could use any frequency or jam any signal
at any time for military purposes without the prospect of invocation of ITU sanctions (such as they are). Even if the ITU provisions supersede the general right to protest by jamming, a state
could legitimately have its military installations jam even a signal
transmitted in accordance with ITU allocations. 78
There is but scant indication of the effect of the ITU provisions in a situation in which a member state (State A) decides to
jam a transmission from a military installation of another member
state (State B). Postulations of the full scope and impact of article
50 are merely conjecture. It may be that a state, by having signed
the Convention, would be deemed to have consented to any use
by another member of its military radio installations, in full freedom; in this case, state A would have no right to jam the military
signal of state B. A different result would perhaps be reached if
B's transmission were a menace to A's national security, on international common-law grounds, or under a treaty such as the Broadcasting Convention. Another possible interpretation of article 50
is that A's right to jam will depend upon whether or not B has
complied "so far as possible" with the provisions of the Regulations, to prevent harmful interference. The propriety of A's jamming thus would not be ascertainable until a determination is
78 Note that at customary international law, a belligerent nation retained complete
control over the passage of radiowaves over its territory. See HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY nm UNITED STATES 607 (1945); Scott, The
Institute of International Law, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 716, 727 (1927).
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made of the rectitude of B's transmission. A third construction of
article 50, obviously applicable if A's transmission is from a
military installation, is that the Convention simply does not control military radio installations. The result of this interpretation
is that A may jam B, or B may jam A, with frequency rights
accruing to "the firstest with the mostest."
Furthermore, nowhere in the Convention or its regulations is
the word "military" defined. Arguably, satellites launched by
military departments of a government would be exempt from fulfilling (except "so far as possible") the ITU requirements. 79 Thus
the provision might act to exempt satellites launched by our Air
Force rather than NASA, although their purposes are no less
peaceful and research-oriented than would be NASA's. Or, perhaps, as has been suggested, the Soviet Union's satellites, which
are not launched by any of its military agencies, could be claimed
to fall within article 50 by sheer force of the presence of military
personnel within. 80 The same, of course, is true of our own manned
satellites. Furthermore, as article 50 now reads, the purpose of the
communication need not be military if only the radio installation
is. If the United States Congress should enact legislation requiring
that a commercial satellite system be government-owned for the
first few years of its operation, there is the real possibility that
military radio installations would be involved. 81 As of this writing,
however, it appears likely that Congress will enact a compromise
bill which provides for private ownership. 82 This would preclude
classification of the installation as military.
See Glazer, supra note 57, at 297.
See ibid.
81 See statement of Congressman Ryan (N.Y.), reported in N.Y. Times, July 28, 1961,
p. 7, col. I. Likewise, the head of the President's study group on the commercial
satellite system recommended that the satellites be developed in connection with the
military services, since government facilities and financing would be needed. See Wiesner
Report printed in full, Aviation Week, Jan. 23, 1961, pp. 79-87.
82 See story in N.Y. Times, March 29, 1962, p. 14, col. 4. As of April 30, 1962 both
House and Senate committees had approved a bill which was a compromise between the
original Administration proposal, the desires of various members of Congress, and views
of the communication industry, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1962, p. 17, col. 2. The compromise
bill provides that 50% of the stock will be sold to international communications carriers
and the other 50% will be sold to the general public. The no-par value stock is to be
sold at no more than $100 a share. Foreign governments, corporations, and persons would
be permitted to own up to one-fifth of the non-carrier stock. The compromise was achieved
only after a long and vigorous national debate on the question of ownership. If privately
owned, many feared that A.T. &: T. would monopolize the system, taking advantage of
technological advances achieved largely through research financed by American tax79
80
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Closely related to the characterization problem, is the question
of how another state can identify a satellite as military or nonmilitary. In contrast to aircraft and naval vessels, space ships are
of such a nature as to elude identification as military or non-military by other than the launching state unless the latter voluntarily
announces the character of the satellite. Furthermore, article 19,
paragraph 6 of the Radio Regulations provides that each member
may "establish its own measures for identifying its stations used
for national defence." This right is qualified by the member's
duty, "as far as possible," to use recognizable call signs containing
distinctive letters showing its nationality. But even if an objective
characterization of the radio installation were possible, the pracpayers, Aviation Week, July 17, 1961, p. 38, although President McNeeley, of A.T. &: T.
reports that his company has put many millions of dollars into research and development
work which is contributing directly to satellite communications, N.Y. Times, April 26,
1962, p. 16, col. 3. At one time at least, it was believed that NASA administrator, James
Vvebb, concurred in the recommendation by the United Research Corporation, following
a NASA-sponsored study, to "defer private ownership by adopting a policy of interim
public ownership with private operation and the clear intention to transfer to private
ownership at the earliest feasible time, unless it is later determined that such transfer
is not in the best public interest." See Aviation Week, July 3, 1961, p. 31. Senator Russell
Long (La.), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Monopoly, early announced his
opposition to ownership by a very few large corporations, and suggested that the question
of ownership was not a routine question to be decided by a regulatory agency, but a major
public policy problem which should be settled by Congress. See Aviation Week, July 17,
1961, p. 38.
If the system is to be privately owned, the additional problem arises of who will be
allowed to participate in the ownership. At least three plans were under consideration:
ownership by one company, leasing services to the other companies (N.Y. Times, June 4,
1961, p. l); ownership by a joint venture including only international common carriers
(N.Y. Times, June 6, 1961, p. 12); ownership by a joint venture which would extend as
well to manufacturers of equipment for the satellite system (N.Y. Times, June 4, 1961,
p. l); Klass, Aerospace Companies' Role Stirs Commercial Satellite Controversy, Aviation
Week, May 22, 1961, p. 28; Aviation Week, June 5, 1961, p. 39; Klass, Commercial
Satellite Owner Limits Will Be Reconsidered by FCC, Aviation Week, June 12, 1961,
p. 34. The Kennedy administration has left the question of the nature of private ownership to be determined by the FCC (N.Y. Times, July 25, 1961, p. 1, col. 1 and Aviation
\Veek, July 31, 1961, p. 25), but the Justice Department also formulated a set of requirements
to be fulfilled to avoid the sanctions of the antitrust laws (N.Y. Times, June 4, 1961, p. 1,
col. 3). In late summer 1961, the FCC dismissed the General Electric petition for participation in the ownership of the system by equipment manufacturers, and authorized
nine international communication common carriers to proceed to organize a joint venture
to own and operate a system. The FCC authorization specified that equipment must be
selected through competitive bidding by the manufacturers (so that subsidiaries of the
carriers would not get preference) and that no single carrier be in a position to dominate
"to the detriment of any other common carrier." Sec N.Y. Times, July 26, 1961, p. 12, col.
3; Aviation Weck, July 31, 1961, p. 25. When the Administration submitted its proposal to
Congress private ownership was provided for with two classes of stock, one with voting
and dividend rights to be sold at $1,000 a share to the general public, including communication companies, and the other to the communication carriers who would have
received their financial gain by including the stock in their rate bases.
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tically operative identification techniques are within the exclusive
control of the launching state. Even assuming, therefore, that a
clearer definition of "military" is possible and forthcoming, the
ease with which a satellite could alternately or simultaneously
carry on commercial and military reconnaissance activities casts
some doubt on the wisdom of maintaining such a stark distinction
between military and non-military radio installations, and perhaps
on the desirability of exempting military transmissions at all.
A possible solution is suggested by the evolution of a new
meaning of the word "peaceful." The United Nations resolution83
limiting outer space activities to "peaceful" uses is now deemed not
to prohibit "military" uses. 84 "Peaceful" now has come to mean
"non-agressive," rather than "non-military," thus placing the
military satellite in an unregulated position as long as it is nonaggressive. Similarly, as to military installations, a distinction
could be recognized between peaceful military uses and combative
military uses. Since the use of military installations for essentially
peaceful uses should not be available as an escape hatch from the
ITU provisions, no exception should be made for this type of
transmission. On the other hand, when a transmission is used for
combative purposes, ITU provisions will receive meager consideration. Therefore, the exemption provision should be limited to nonpeaceful military uses, and should constitute, as indeed article 50
does now, only a recognition that the members retain their entire
freedom with regard to such uses. No state should be required to
take especial care not to interrupt such uses; a state's transmission
outside the ITU provisions should be given no extra consideration by other users of the airwaves.

III.

PROBLEMS To BE REsoLVED AT THE

1963

EXTRAORDINARY

CONFERENCE

The inadequacies of existing international law, both customary and treaty, to deal with the problems of operating a global
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 13th Sess., Plenary 792 (A/4090) (1958).
A.B.A., Report of Committee on the Law of Outer Space-Recommendations:
1959, SENATE SYMPOSIUM 571, 576. But cf. definition by the International Atomic Energy
Agency, of "peaceful" as "non-military." Ibid. If "peaceful" means non-aggressive, any
use not constituting an attack is permissible, including defensive actions such as reconnaissance. The United States favors this definition. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
seems to favor defining as "peaceful" only non-military activities, especially since the
United States use of U-2 reconnaissance flights and launching of "Midas" and "Samos"
(see note 6 supra). See N.Y. Times, July 30, 1961, § 4 (Week's Review), p. 7, col. I.
83
84

1962]

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS LAW

895

satellite communication system make it clear that new international arrangements must be made. The first opportunity will
come at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference,
hopefully to be held in 1963, whose first order of business is to
provide adequate frequency allocations for all classes of space
communications services. Certainly frequency allocations are of
pressing importance in a world with a radio spectrum bursting
at the seams, and the problem of assignment of channels for
the imminent commercial satellite systems surely ranks among
the first in urgency. In addition to difficult technical matters, many
important policy questions must be answered if the allocations are
to be wisely made. It will be very difficult to decide how many
channels which are or will be technically available, should be
assigned to communication satellite use. In addition to avoiding
undue interference with existing earth-bound radio installations,
consideration must be given to avoiding obstruction of astronomical research which today depends so much on extremely weak
radio transmissions from celestial bodies from far out in space.
Likewise, in assigning frequencies for space communications some
reasonable adjustment must be reached to avoid any more interference with and from military transmissions than is necessary.
Resolution of these matters will be unusually difficult and delicate
from both the technical and policy standpoints. As a minimum the
delegates must change or at least clarify existing regulations concerning "research," "military," and the range of regulated frequencies, for the reasons pointed out above. Many additional
problems, as well, must be met head-on, and as early as possible,
if a commercial system is to operate successfully.
Consideration should be given to the advisability of committing the operation of a global commercial satellite system to the
care of an international, non-commercial organization, such as
the United Nations or the International Telecommunication
Union. In a discussion not directed specifically to communications
satellites, Professors McDougal and Lipson have made a suggestion
which could be applied to such satellites also. They suggest that
the United Nations enter the field of satellite experimentation
with the cooperation of the states which possess the facilities for
launching and tracking. The United Nations would decide the
purpose of the flights, determine their payloads, design the instru-
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mentation, and finance the construction of the satellites and their
contents. 85
Application of this idea to a communications satellite would
be attractive primarily to the many states which will not have
an immediate requirement for substantial allocation of frequencies for their own space activities, but which will be concerned
lest the large states such as the United States and the Soviet Union
pre-empt the frequencies technologically most desirable, or use
the lower frequencies in a way that will cause significant interference with ground services.86 For the states which have no present need to participate in the operation of a commercial system,
but which will grow into the need, international and non-exclusive
ownership, open to newcomers, would be most desirable. Such
countries will not be able to do with satellite frequencies what it is
suspected some have done with ground allocations, i.e., file notice
with the IFRB of use of a frequency which actually is not being
used presently merely to assure availability in the future. Unless
some protective device is provided the presently less-industrialized
countries will find all channels pre-empted by those countries now
capable of using them.
In considering this solution, however, the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States are extremely important. At
present, and undoubtedly for a considerable time to come, these
two countries are the only ones technically and financially able to
orbit and support communication satellites. They are not likely to
want to give up operating control, at least unless they are given a
dominating position in the governing board. Nevertheless, these
two powers cannot afford to ignore the interests of the less affluent
countries who must agree to any changes in existing regulations. If
the existing rules are not changed to protect non-research space
communications against jamming, the other powers will have a
fairly strong bargaining position.
If a single-nation system is put into orbit and operated, addiSee McDougal &: Lipson, supra note 45, at 430-31.
The first occasion of conflict between space and earth transmissions was in 1957,
when a Russian sputnik made use of the frequencies of 20.005 me and 40.002 me. The
20.005 me frequency is in the center of a channel which the ITU has assigned as the
Standard Frequency Service. The sputnik transmissions were on the exact frequency
assigned to Station PEN at Kootwijk, the Netherlands, and only five kilocycles from the
frequency 20.0 assigned to Station WWV in Maryland. See Haley, Space Age Presents
Immediate Legal Problems, FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER. SPACE 5, 10·11
(Haley &: Heinrich ed. 1959).
85
86
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tional matters arise which deal with the relationship between the
owner and non-participating states. How will the owner of the
system handle the problem of "freeloaders" who have refused to
participate? What rights will a state have to participate, and what
means for enforcing these rights? What rights would an owner
have against a "freeloading" state which had, for one reason or
another, been denied the opportunity to participate in the system?
And what provision should be made for states which have no
present need to participate, but may have in the future? A suggested solution to the last question is that allocations might be of
limited duration, subject to re-examination of the licensee's comparative merit. 87 If United Nations or ITU ownership is not
feasible, the possibility of limiting the duration of assignments
certainly should be considered now, before any allocations are
made.
Probably the ITU would be technologically more competent
to operate a satellite system than the United Nations proper. Since
the ITU is now a special agency of the United Nations, it might
be more realistic to speak only in terms of possible ITU operation
of such a system. At this time, however, "the ITU is not prepared
... to go into the operating business of such multi-million dollar
network. It would take months and months, going into years to
change the regulatory technical character of the ITU to fulfill
such functions. Similarly, any new organization which might be
created to act as an operating agency would ... require much more
time than is available to acquire the necessary know-how and
competence. " 88
If there is to be no central, non-partisan ownership of the commercial system, there will likely arise a situation in which both the
United States and the Soviet Union seek to put systems into operation. Assuming that the sponsoring groups are willing to risk nonuse because two systems are more than will be needed, who is to
decide whether or not there is room from the standpoint of frequency interference for more than one system circling the earth?
Who is to decide, if there is room for only one, which sponsor's
87 This suggestion, of course, opens up the possibilities of censorship-through the
refusal to renew a license because of broadcasts unfavorable to a particular state. This
also is a problem meriting attention. Cf. text accompanying notes 94, 95 infra.
88 Gross, Secretary General of the ITU, Address to the XII International Astro•
nautical Congress, Washington, D. C., October 4, 1961.
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system will prevail? Will the choice depend, partially or wholly,
on the type of system proposed?89 Will anyone other than the
sponsor have a voice in determining the kind of system to be used?
If more than one system is put into operation, how will frequency
allocations be made? The present system, for all its notification
and charts and allocations, operates on the order of a first-come,
first-served basis, with the IFRB registering the assignment of the
government which first notifies it, and thereafter informing all
other assigning governments that the frequencies have been assigned.90 Certainly these are problems which must be considered
as soon as possible.
At least as pressing a problem, whose solution is precedent to
commercial satellite success, is the formulation of a set of sensible
rules governing generally when the owner of the satellite will have
the right to protest interference with his system's communications.91
The first such problem presented is the choice between the
theories upon which a state may claim the right to jam a "transgressing" radio signal. Neither the sovereignty-over-airspace theory nor the national security theory is entirely satisfactory, both
allowing jamming in instances which seem not to justify interference.92 And granted that a state does have sovereignty over the
airspace over its territory, the second problem is how high this
sovereignty extends. To limit it to "airspace" in the context of
satellite communications is to impose an artificial boundary line;
to recognize its extension ad infinitum is to thwart legitimate
satellite use, without giving more than two or three states the
power to enforce their right.
A second, and probably much more important and realistic
89 Among the choices to be made concerning types of satellite systems are those
between active and passive systems, and between low-, medium-, and high-altitude systems.
Cost has about eliminated the passive system; and combined cost and technology dictate
a slight preference for the medium-altitude system over the low-and high-altitude
systems. See Fortune Magazine, July 1961, pp. 158-60, 248.
90 Arts. 2, 9, ITU Radio Regulations (Geneva 1959).
91 Probably some consideration should be given to the need to formulate rules which
will differentiate between types of uses of the system. The immunity or vulnerability
to jamming may be different for (1) commercial private telephone and telegraph communications, (2) commercial public broadcasts, (3) official propaganda, and (4) official
communications other than propaganda.
92 See examples set out in Appendix.
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question is the matter of program content. If only typical commercial messages are transmitted from one country to another,
such as is now done by international wire or telephone companies,
content of the message in the great majority of the cases has no
political significance. On the other hand, if news and possibly
propaganda is broadcast for general reception, attempts to control
the content undoubtedly would be made, possibly by jamming,
and with satellites the effect is very likely to prevent reception of
the broadcast in countries other than just the one objecting to
receipt within its own territorial boundaries.
If an international body is given jurisdiction over the space
communication satellites the problem of regulating program content becomes absolutely crucial. Experience in the United States
with allocation of channels by a licensing procedure certainly does
not justify any hopes that international licensing will be a matter
solely of technical engineering accommodations. Investigations by
Congress, comments by members of the Federal Communications
Commission, and public protests by various vocal groups against
television programming of violence, sex, and crime, not to mention stupid or vapid fare, indicate that allocation of a technically
limited supply of radio channels will inevitably become a battleground for making basic social value judgments. International
accommodation promises to be at least as difficult. The Broadcasting Treaty of 1936, which raised the same concerns, was ratified by
neither the Soviet Union nor the United States.93 The great difference of opinion that exists today about control of program content
is illustrated by recent Geneva negotiations between the United
States and Russia, with Russia advocating prevention or regulation of critical comments about another nation, and the United
States rejecting such regulation as impinging unduly on basic concepts of freedom of speech.94 It is perhaps noteworthy that the
United Nations resolution condemning propaganda which might
provoke acts of aggression or threats to peace, requests control by
each government only "within its constitutional limits." 95
See text accompanying notes 47-57 supra.
See N.Y. Times, April 10, 1962, p. 5, col. 3.
05 Resolution llO (II) adopted by tbe United Nations General Assembly at its 108th
plenary meeting on Nov. 3, 1947. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 2d Sess., Resolutions, Sept.
16-Nov. 29, at 14 (A/519) (1947).
03
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CONCLUSIONS

In the final analysis, it is difficult to believe that existing rules
of international law, either customary or treaty, can fill the needs
of a modern world expanding operations beyond its own atmosphere. Perhaps international law, much as the common law enunciated in the law courts of seventeenth century England, has become too rigid in its classifications, categorizations, and theories.
There is no High Lord Chancellor to step outside of the system,
get a panoramic view of the legal and cosmic systems, and then
formulate policies which will not be twisted and warped by trying
to fit them into out-dated and ossified legal rules. Many of the legal
results which would come from application of customary international law rules would be reached by application of the policy
ends deemed paramount; but many of the undesirable effects of
fitting new problems into old molds could be obviated and avoided
by establishing a new set of standards.
Such a set of standards should be formulated at the 1963 Radio
Conference, or, if agreement cannot be reached at the conference,
as soon as possible thereafter. The questions to be asked are: What
ends do we want to serve? What standards do we need to best
serve these ends? "What legal consequences should be entailed
by certain activities in order that they be accommodated with other
activities under given policies?" 96 These questions apply to all
· satellites but probably with greater force and certainly with more
urgency to communications satellites. The broad classes of problems likely to arise are foreseeable; an attempt should be made to
cope with them before they arise, perhaps even to prevent their
emergence.
Among the first tasks of the delegates to the 1963 Conference
should be the reshaping of article 50 of the ITU Convention dealing with military installations. There is no reason to provide such
a broad opportunity to escape the ITU regulations. A feasible and
more desirable formulation for reserving to the states their military
freedom would recognize such freedom with regard only to combative uses of radio. Although the inevitable lack of effect of the
ITU regulations in the event of actual combat suggests that there
is no practical reason to attempt to regulate .mch usage, this does
96

McDougal &: Lipson, supra note 45.
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not justify the existing sweeping exception for all military radio
installations.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the need for agreement
on effective means of enforcing any set of rules to be formulated
and invoked by an injured state or other owner of a space communication system. The procedures presently outlined in the ITU
Radio Regulations to cope with instances of harmful interference
are at least inept and possibly are completely unworkable for space
communications. It may prove impossible for the two great missile
powers and the other countries of the world to agree on a more
effective enforcement procedure, but an attempt must be made.
Because the need for freedom from interference is technically so
important to the success of the missile and satellite programs
of both countries, a mutual and actually almost identical concern
exists in the United States and the Soviet Union to find a solution.
If they cannot agree in this field it is hard to visualize a situation in
which they can. This may be one of those fortunate situations
where both countries will be forced to agree on and operate a
regulatory scheme, and it may be that in doing so each will learn
that some measure of mutual trust is possible.
Several alternatives may be suggested as routes to effective enforcement. If uniform national legislation is possible, an aggrieved
party might seek determination and enforcement of his rights in
the national courts of the offending party. This might be more
effective than the executive routes for enforcement now prescribed
in the Radio Regulations. An alternative, again more efficacious
than the present measures, would be to allow the aggrieved party
to bring suit in a court of his own state, with other states required
to give full faith and credit to the determination in that court.
Again, this system avoids the executive branches of the government (assuming some separation of powers), and would more
closely approach, as it were, a determination by the state's super
ego rather than its ego. A third route which might be chosen is the
ultimate adjudication of the dispute by the International Court of
Justice. Preliminary negotiation channels such as appear in article 7
of the Broadcasting Convention might be provided; or it might be
possible to convert the IFRB into a regulatory, adjudicative agency,
with a right of appeal to the International Court.97 A fourth possi97

See suggestions made in Glazer, supra note 57, at 315.
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bility is the creation of a special technical adjudicatory agency, like
the European Community Court, or an international FCC-type
body, which would have the ultimate role in deciding disputes.
Any of these routes is preferable to the avenue outlined by the
present Radio Regulations, which seems to be at best an unfinished traffic circle or possibly even a dead end street.
These, then, are some of the pressing problems in addition to
frequency allocation which should be considered by all nations
and should be faced by the delegates to the Extraordinary Conference next year. Setting policy on frequency allocation is first a
very knotty technical problem and the parameters of the possible
solutions must be established by telecommunication engineers and
scientists. Nevertheless, adopting the opinions of this technical
group on scientific matters must not be accepted as the only, or
even the best, method for making social policy judgments. Very
important national and international political problems are bound
up in the decisions to be made, hopefully at the 1963 Conference.
The United States should be prepared to present and promote
adoption of our concepts concerning the values to be agreed on by
the nations of the world. We must be flexible in our approach to
the negotiations, but unless we have thoroughly considered what
our position should be as to these matters we will perhaps inadvertently limit fundamental rights such as freedom of speech.
Only complete failure to reach any agreement at the conference
on regulation of space communications could bode more ill for
the success of our program. Now is the time to remember that
many a tragedy can be averted by a bit of farsighted planning.
APPENDIX
The satellite shown is about the distance from the earth that a 24-hour equatorial
satellite would be (the earth as shown, however, has about twice the diameter it should
have). The solid lines with arrows represent radio signals, with the arrowheads indicating
the direction of the transmission.

Example 1. (See note 35 and accompanying text.)-States F and G:
F and G are adjacent states. The dashed 0---) lines drawn from the center of the
earth through points on their common boundary would mark the boundary of their air
sovereignties under the prevailing theory. The dotted ( • • •) lines are parallel lines drawn
upward from the boundaries of each state, parallel to the line which would be drawn
between the center of the earth and the geometric center (centroid) of that state. (These
lines arc not, however, perpendicular to a chord drawn between two points on the boundary line the state: unless the state were a perfect circle on the earth's surface, the infinite
number of chords connecting boundary points would produce many divergent parallel
columns.) The wedge-shaped space between the parallel columns of States F and G represents space which would be unowned under the "wedge" theory.
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Example 2, (See notes 9, llll and accompanying text.)-States E and G:
None of the radio signals is receivable in State E, nor do they pass through E's
airspace. State E could nevertheless jam the signal as it passed above its airspace terri-
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tory if it were a threat to its security, or as it passed through its territory under the
usque ad coelum doctrine.
The signal numbered (1), descending into State F, does not pass through or over the
territory of State G under any theory. If, to jam that signal, G had to invade the territory of F or E, G would have the duty not to jam.
Example J. (See text accompanying note 17.)-States C and F:
The radio signal ascending to the satellite passes through the airspace of C. Because
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radiowaves travel in a straight line, and because of the upward direction of the transmissions, ground receivers in C could not capture this signal. Likewise, although the signal
numbered (2) is traveling downward through State F, its direction is such that it would
not be received in State F. Technically, however, under the "airspace" theory, C and F
could jam these transmissions.

Example 4. (See text accompanying note 36.)-State D:
Using the theory that a state may jam a signal only if it passes through its airspace,
State D could jam the signal passing above it only if the boundary lines of its airspace
were drawn straight out from the center of the earth. If the parallel column theory
is used, the signal does not pass through D's airspace.
Example 5. (See text accompanying note 37.)-State F:
State F could jam the radio signal (number (1)) regardless of whether the airspace
doctrine or the usque ad coelum doctrine was used. But on the usque ad coelum and
resulting trespass rationale (where national security was not involved), F could not le•
gitimately jam the satellite directly if the parallel column theory were used.

